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We study auctions under different entry rules. In the field, individuals self-select 
into auctions and regulations often require them to meet specific qualifications. In 
this experiment we assess the role of voluntary entry and financial requirements 
on the incidence of severe overbidding and bankruptcies, which are widespread 
in common value auctions. We show that voluntary entry amplifies overbidding 
and increases bankruptcy rates. Qualified entry has only modest impacts on 
overbidding. This study adds new insights to existing experiments where all 
subjects are usually placed exogenously into auctions. 
 
 
ENCHÈRES À VALEUR COMMUNE AVEC ENTRÉE 
VOLONTAIRE ET PAR QUALIFICATION 
 
Nous étudions les enchères sous différentes règles d’entrée. En pratique, les 
individus choisissent eux-mêmes de participer aux enchères et les réglementa- 
tions exigent souvent qu’ils remplissent certains critères de qualification. Notre 
expérience évalue le rôle joué par l’entrée volontaire et par les exigences finan- 
cières dans la fréquence des offres excessives et des faillites, qui sont très répan- 
dues dans les enchères à valeur commune. Nous montrons que l’entrée volontaire 
amplifie les offres excessives et accroît les taux de faillite. L’entrée par qualifica- 
tion n’a qu’un impact modeste sur les offres excessives. Cette étude apporte de 
nouveaux enseignements par rapport aux expériences existantes puisque dans ces 
dernières, les sujets sont en général placés dans les enchères de manière exogène. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
In common value auctions, bidders compete for an item that has the same 
value for everyone. Typically the item value is uncertain and bidders base their 
decisions on estimates of the true value, which is generally observed only after 
the auction is over. Canonical examples of this type of auction include procu- 
rement of public construction and public works projects, and leases and sales 
of government assets such as mineral extraction rights and the radio spectrum. 
Reverse auctions for private procurement of inputs or services also have a strong 
common value component. Persistent overbidding is a robust empirical finding 
for these types of auctions, both in naturally-occurring data and in data from 
controlled experiments (Wilson [1992]; Kagel and Levin [2002]). The winning 
bidder often incurs systematic losses, a phenomenon known as the “Winner’s 
Curse.” 
This study investigates the implications of sampling biases due to self-se- 
lection and restricted entry on the winner’s curse using laboratory common 
value auctions. Our main research question is whether selecting bidders in 
different ways leads to an improvement in auction performance and bidding 
behavior. This could occur, for example, through additional opportunities for 
individual learning, since previous experimental research on the winner’s curse 
shows that bidding performance improves over time. To vary learning opportu- 
nities, we consider a benchmark situation where bidders are randomly assigned 
to a given auction and compare it with two other situations where entry into 
auctions occurs either through the self-selection of bidders or through qualifi- 
cation—in which only the better-earning bidders can bid in the more risky and 
higher-stake auctions.  One key measure of performance is bankruptcy rates,  
as bankruptcy generally implies a lack of completion of the transaction or task, 
generating a cost for society and the termination of (possibly long-term) supply 
relationships. We also compare behavior with the theoretical predictions for 
equilibrium bidding in these treatments, and seek to identify the characteristics 
of bidders who self-select into bidding in common value auctions. This study 
joins a wave of experimental investigations of specific auction rules that are of 
interest for field applications (Armantier, Holt and Plott [2013]; Merlob, Plott 
and Zhang [2012]). 
This paper focuses on a comparison of different mechanisms through which 
the sample of participants is selected into bidding. In the field, auction partici- 
pants self-select into bidding and are not a random sample of the population. We 
know little about the bidding behavior of those who seek to enter these auctions 
compared to the population at large. Moreover, the pool of potential bidders 
presents an additional selection bias because entry in many auctions is restricted 
by the auctioneer. This is particularly relevant for public procurement auctions, 
although it is present also in auctions with indicative bidding.1 
 
 
1. In auctions with indicative bidding, bidders are short-listed after a first round of non-binding 
bids. The short list is established based on the level of the bid and on considerations about bidders’ 
qualifications. This procedure has been employed in privatization, takeover, and acquisition 
auctions (Kagel, Pevnitskaya and Ye [2008]). Examples include the acquisition of Ireland’s cable 
television provider Cablelink Ltd., the privatization of the Ente Nazionale Idrocarburi of Italy, the 
takeover auction for Daewoo Motors of South Korea and some real estate markets (Foley [2003]). 
 
  
Almost all auction experiments, by contrast, do not disclose the nature of 
the experiment when recruiting subjects and require everyone to participate in 
auction bidding.2 The only selection that takes place in the laboratory is gene- 
rally through an eventual bankruptcy, which leads the subject to drop out of  
the auction, or low earnings that discourage subjects from returning to “expe- 
rienced” sessions (Casari, Ham and Kagel [2007]). Moreover, very few auction 
experiments have considered endogenous entry. Nearly all of those consider the 
independent private values setting (Ivanova-Stenzel and Salmon [2004]; Palfrey 
and Pevnitskaya [2008]; Ertaç, Hortaçsu and Roberts [2011]), where the win- 
ner’s curse does not occur since bidders know their own value with certainty. In 
these experiments bidders tend to enter the auction too often. Cox, Dinkin and 
Swarthout [2001] is the only previous experiment that studies endogenous entry 
in common value auctions. Subjects’ alternative to auction bidding was the col- 
lection of a known “safe haven” payment. Cox, Dinkin and Swarthout [2001] 
study market size given that entry is endogenous. In our paper market size is 
fixed and we study the selection of bidders in markets. We allow subjects to 
choose between different bidding activities, and also compare different selection 
procedures for entry and not only voluntary self-selection. 
It is important to study self-selection or “qualification” requirements to enter 
common value auctions because they could affect the extent and origins of the 
winner’s curse, which is a severe departure from the predictions of the risk neu- 
tral Nash equilibrium whose source is still unknown. One leading interpretation 
is that bidders’ reasoning fails to account for the adverse selection implicit in 
the winning event. Even if ex-ante estimates were unbiased for everyone, the 
winner is expected to have the highest estimate among all bidders. Hence, when 
conditioning on the event of winning, the winner’s estimate will be (ex-post) 
biased upward (Charness and Levin [2009]). Regardless of the source of the 
winner’s curse, substantial evidence exists that it fades away only very slowly 
and when bidders are allowed enough exposure to the task. Such convergence 
toward the equilibrium predictions is achieved through a combination of indi- 
vidual learning and harsh selection through the survival of the smartest (Casari, 
Ham and Kagel [2007]). Our design allows participants to gain some expe- 
rience through low-stake tasks with a similar underlying logic, which sets up a 
more favorable situation for learning and sorting the most able bidders into the 
high-stake task. Moreover, we include an alternative task that is simpler than an 
auction and expectations about others’ information or rationality levels play no 
role. It is possible that selection at entry also reduces or eliminates the winner’s 
curse in common value auctions. In particular, there may be important welfare 
implications depending on whether the adjustment takes place through learning, 
survival, or selection at entry. 
Policy measures that prevent bankruptcies, such as in public procurement, are 
intended to improve social welfare. As noted above, government auctions for 
public works and reverse auctions for private procurement have a strong com- 
mon value component. Participation in such auctions is often highly regulated 
and limited to qualified bidders in order to prevent the bankruptcy of winning 
contractors. Such bankruptcies are in practice very costly due to the social cost 
of the consequent delay in the completion of public infrastructure, delivery of 
 
2. Theoretical models considering endogenous entry include Harstad [1990], Hausch and Li 
[1993], Levin and Smith [1994], and McAfee and McMillan [1987]. 
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needed inputs or services, and the disappearance of the organizational capital 
embedded in a firm (goodwill). Our experimental design manipulates access to 
the auction markets in some ways analogous to these qualification regulations 
and assesses the impact on bankruptcy. 
We report two main results. First, voluntary entry into common value actions 
does not reduce the winner’s curse, as the fraction of overbidders is higher when 
participants self-select into auctions than in the case of random assignment. Se- 
cond, a simple version of the qualification procedure based on cumulative ear- 
nings does not eliminate winner’s curse bidding but only marginally reduces  
it. Thus, voluntary entry does not improve auction performance or reduced the 
winner’s curse in our experiment, both when compared to random assignment 
and to a simple qualified entry mechanism. 
 
 
SELECTION IN FIELD AUCTIONS 
 
A well-known example of the costly impact of overbidding and bankruptcies 
is the 1996 FCC auction for the C-block radio spectrum, which received winning 
bids of $10.2 billion. The FCC established that auction receipts would be collec- 
ted through an installment plan that permitted the winning bidders to pay their 
debt obligations over a ten-year period. At the time, the C-block auction was 
viewed as a huge success. Several licensees later declared bankruptcy, howe- 
ver, and many others returned the bandwidth originally assigned to them. As a 
result, less than 10% of spectrum issued in the C-block auction was allocated as 
bid, with the remainder either tied up in lengthy bankruptcy court proceedings 
or returned to the FCC for re-auction (Committee on Commerce [1998]; Plott 
[2000]). This case shows the welfare cost of bankruptcy, both in terms of lost 
organizational capital for the winning entities and in terms of unused assets. 
In order to avoid a socially undesirable outcome of bankruptcy by the 
selected contractor, it is common to require that bidders pre-qualify. For 
example, European law restricts participation to public work auctions through a 
certification system. To be certified a firm must meet several criteria regarding 
financial soundness and technical capabilities. In the European Union there  
are criteria concerning the current ability to successfully complete the project 
and others about the recent experience in projects of similar type and amount 
(Directives 93/37/EEC, 97/52/EC, and 2001/78/EC). 
In particular, a contractor can be excluded as  unsuitable  in  accordance 
with criteria of economic and financial standing and of technical knowledge   
or ability. First, a bidder must not have already asked for bankruptcy 
protection. Second, each bidder is required to supply proof of good financial 
and economic standing in terms of guarantees by banks, balance sheets, or in 
other forms.3 This provision helps ensure that the bidder will be able to absorb 
 
 
3. National legislations that implemented the European Directives  provide  additional  
details.  For instance, the Italian legislation (Law 109/94 and Ordinance DPR 34/2000) requires     
a deposit in a locked bank account. Higher discounts on the baseline budget of the procurement 
auction require a greater deposit. Deposit requirements range from a minimum of 2% for no bid 
discount to 12% for a 20% bid discount, to 32% for a 30% bid discount. Legislation about qualifying 
 
  
an eventual loss originating from a miscalculated bid without going bankrupt. In 
our experimental design, we adopt similar criteria to restrict participation in the 
auctions.4 Third, a bidder must possess the technical capability to complete the 
project, including evidence about management’s skills, equipment availability 
and current workforce. Fourth, the firms must have already had substantial 
experience in carrying out projects of the same type and scale. This experience 
refers to the proper completion of projects according to the rules of the trade in 
the last five years, Interestingly, Dyer and Kagel [1996] mention specialization 
as a voluntary strategy of contractors in order to avoid the worst effect of the 
winner’s curse. Within an economic model of auction bidding, specialization 
could provide a restriction in the support of the distribution of the private 
estimate of the object, or a reduction in the variance, which would reduce the 
common value component of the object. This aspect does not play a direct role 
in our experimental design. 
Some national legislation requires bidders to have experience on how to 
handle projects of comparable size of the one currently bid.  When a firm is     
in the official list of recognized contractors, it is generally authorized to bid in 
government auctions within a maximum baseline budget.5 A newly established 
firm will have to acquire experience in small projects before being able to    
bid in large projects. This regulated progression from small to large value 
auctions could provide an effective solution to the high rate of bankruptcies of 
inexperienced bidders. 
Some auctioneers may not care about bidder bankruptcies, of course, and 
could view the overbidding and bidder losses as profitable outcomes to encou- 
rage. In private procurement settings, for example, buyers could benefit when 
suppliers suffer from the winner’s curse. In other cases the auctioneer has long- 
term objectives and may have concerns for bidders’ long-term viability. Consi- 
der for instance auction houses that may want to discourage overbidding as a 
way to maintain a good reputation among the public, or buyers of services or 
material inputs that will be delivered frequently over a long-term contract or are 
completed with a long horizon.  The entry restrictions in public procurement and 
privatization settings indicate that some auctioneers place a value on avoiding 
bankruptcies. 
 
 
 
 
bidding is common also in other nations; for instance, see the registration requirements for the 
Singapore Building Construction Authority [2014]. 
4. According to canonical theory, the rationale for the second criterion may be to avoid       
the problem of rational “overbidding” when there is little to lose, which increases the risk of 
bankruptcy. Moreover, even in equilibrium, ex-post profits of the winner may be negative. The 
criterion on technical capability is not relevant in the abstract experimental design. 
5. Italian law lists 47 distinct types of projects (art. 18 DPR 34/2000), where experience in     
a different type of project is irrelevant for pre-qualification. For instance, experience in building 
power plants does not help to qualify for maintenance works of the power grid, and experience in 
providing lighted road signs for highways does not help to qualify for bidding to supply non-lighted 
road signs. Moreover, a firm is placed in one of eight budget categories, each one characterized by 
a maximum budget ranging from a quarter of a million euros to fifteen million euros and above. In 
the recent past the firm must have successfully completed at least one project of the same type with 
a budget of at least forty percent the maximum ceiling of the category (art. 3 DPR 34/2000). This 
condition could be met both with projects for the government or for the private sector. 
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THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
 
All subjects placed bids in three activities: a high-stake, a medium-stake and 
a low-stake activity, which differed in the level of equilibrium earnings as well 
as in the level and type of risk. 
The high- and medium-stake activities were common value auctions with 
identical rules, except for the level of the equilibrium earnings in dollars. In 
each period the item value  x0   was randomly drawn from a uniform distribution 
with upper and lower bounds [50, 950].  In each auction each bidder received a 
private information estimate, x, drawn from a uniform distribution on an interval 
centered on the actual item value  [x0 −15, x0 +15] .  The instructions 
illustrate this situation with the following example: 
 
Value of the item 
x0  = 328 
Lower limit 
313 
Upper limit 
343 
 
 
The private estimate x may be anywhere in 
this interval 
 
 
We implemented a first price sealed-bid auction procedure: the high bidder 
paid her bid amount b1 and earned profits equal to x0 -b1 . For risk neutral bid- 
ders the symmetric risk neutral Nash equilibrium (RNNE) bid function f (x) is 
given by Kagel and Richard [2001]:6 
f (x)= x −15 + h(x) , (1) 
 
where  
h(x)= 30 / (n +1)  exp{(−n / 30)(x − 
65)} 
 
 
(2) 
  
and n is the number of active bidders in the auction. This equilibrium bid func- 
tion combines strategic considerations similar to those involved in first-price 
private value auctions, and item valuation considerations resulting from the bias 
in the estimate value conditional on the event of winning. We deal with the 
latter first. 
In common value auctions bidders usually win the item when they have the 
highest, or one of the highest estimates of value. Define E[x0 | X = x1n ] to be 
the expected value of the item conditional on having x1n , the highest among n 
estimate values, then 
 
 
6. The Nash equilibrium solution and other theoretical aspects of common value auctions will 
be discussed only in reference to estimates in the interval 65 £ x £ 935  (called region 2), where  by 
design about 97% of the observations lie (Wilson [1977]; Milgrom and Weber [1982]). Within 
region 2, bidders have no end point information to help in calculating the expected value of the item. 
 
50 950 
  
E[x0 | X = x1n ]= x1n − (n −1) / (n +1) 15 . (3) 
  
This provides a convenient measure of the extent to which bidders suffer from 
the winner’s curse since in auctions in which the high estimate holder always 
wins the item, bidding above E[x0 | X = x1n ] results in negative expected profit.7 
In each activity there were n = 5 subjects, which previous studies suggest 
being sufficient for the winner’s curse to emerge. With n = 5 the bid factor— 
defined as the signal minus the bid—that generates zero expected profits is 
10.00, or approximately 67% of the total bid factor in the RNNE.8 
The low-stake activity was a company takeover game where there was a buyer 
and a seller who moved sequentially (e.g., Samuelson [1984]; Casari, Zhang and 
Jackson [2016]). For this activity there is no competition with other subjects and 
no strategic risk. We used this auction environment to provide a bidding activity 
for bankrupt subjects and those who wished to avoid bidding in the interactive 
common value auctions. Similar to the common value auction, subjects who fail 
to condition on the event of winning may suffer from the winner’s curse. This 
bidding activity thus allows us to assess subjects’ general and initial propensi- 
ties to overbid but in a simplified environment that eliminates strategic uncer- 
tainty and has smaller opportunities to gain and lower risk to lose money.  In 
this auction the buyer made a take-it-or-leave-it offer  b ∈[0, 36] to a computer 
seller whose company’s value was s. The seller either rejected or accepted the 
bid. The payoff for the seller was s if she rejected and b if she accepted. The 
payoffs for the buyer were 0 if the seller rejected and  (1.5s −b) if she 
accep- ted. The company could have all possible values s between 6 and 24. 
When making a decision, the seller had private information about s, while the 
buyer only knew that each realization of s had equal probability.  The computer 
seller 
accepted all bids greater or equal to the seller’s company value. 
Hence, the task was a bilateral bargaining problem against a computer with 
asymmetric information and valuations. The informational disadvantage of the 
buyer was offset by an assumption that the buyer’s value was 1.5 times the 
seller value, s. A rational buyer had the following objective function (Holt and 
Sherman [1994]): 
 b −6   b −6  Rational objective:  
 
1.5⋅ 6 +
 −b  
(4) 
 24 − 6   2     
A bid of 12 is optimal for the risk-neutral rational buyer who accounts for the 
selection effect arising from the fact that sellers only accept bids that exceed their 
valuation s. This bid yields an expected profit of 0.5. 
 
 
 
7. This design mostly followed Casari, Ham and Kagel [2007]. Even with zero correlation 
between bids and estimate values, if everyone else bids above E  x0 | X = x1n  , bidding above 
E  x0 | X = x1n   results in negative expected profit as well. As such, if the high estimate holder 
frequently wins the auction, or a reasonably large number of rivals are bidding above E  x0 | X = x1n  , 
bidding above E  x0 | X = x1n  is likely to earn negative expected profit. 
8. This approximation is based on the fact that within region 2 the RNNE bid function is 
essentially   f (x)= x −15 , because the negative exponential term  h(x) in equation (1), 
approaches zero rapidly as x moves beyond 65. 
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EXPERIMENTAL PROCEDURES 
 
Overview 
 
The activities in each session are outlined in Table 1. Each session had 15 
subjects who underwent an investment part, a training part, and a main part. 
 
Table 1.  Session chart 
 
PART REPETITIONS 
(Periods) 
GROUP A GROUP B GROUP C 
INVESTMENT 1 Risky task Risky task Risky task 
TRAINING 1 + 3 Low Low Low 
same for all 1 + 3 Medium Medium Medium 
treatments 1 + 3 High High High 
MAIN 5 Low Medium High 
assignment of 5 Low Medium High 
subjects to 5 Low Medium High 
activities varies 5 Low Medium High 
by treatment 5 Low Medium High 
Note: Group composition  could  change  after  every  block.  Every  line  of  the  table  is  a  block.  Groups  
A + B + C = 15 participants, with 5 in each group. 
 
 
Each session opened with a simple task to measure subjects’ preferences 
toward risk, along the lines of Gneezy and Potters [1997]. Everyone chose an 
amount up to $5 to place into a risky investment that yielded 0 or three times the 
invested amount with equal probability. The outcome of this risky investment 
decision was determined at the end of the session. 
The training part was identical across treatments and aimed at familiarizing 
subjects with the various activities: low-stake, medium-stake and high-stake 
auctions. For each activity there was a sequence of one dry run (unpaid) period 
followed by three periods for profit. After each sequence, the participants were 
randomly divided into three independent markets with five bidders each. Sub- 
jects received full feedback at the end of each auction.9 
The starting balance was $10. In the low- and medium-stake activities, addi- 
tional earnings in points were converted into dollars at a rate of $1 for every 4 
points. In the high-stake activity, the conversion rate was $1 for every 2 points 
and each subject also received $0.25 in every period. As a result, the high-stake 
activity yielded equilibrium earnings more than five times as large as the low- 
stake activity (Figure 1).10 
 
9. In the medium- and high-stake auctions an admissible bid was any number between 0.00 and 
x + 22.50 . This upper restriction on allowable bids was intended to prevent bankruptcies resulting 
from typing errors, while still permitting substantial overbidding. Bids could be specified in up to 
two decimal places. The instructions informed the subjects about the underlying distribution of s, 
x0 and x. A copy of the instructions are included in the appendix. 
10. This participation bonus does not change the optimal bidding strategy. It was necessary to 
make these auctions financially more attractive, since overbidding (documented below and throughout 
this common value auction literature) typically led to negative trading profits for the winning 
 
Figure 1. Equilibrium and actual earnings of the three possible activities 
 
  
 
High-stake auction 
 
 
Medium-stake auction 
 
Low-stake auction 
(no strategic risk) 
 
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 
Per-period expected earnings in US dollar cents 
 
Note: Average per-period earnings when placing a RNNE bid. The large and medium-stake auctions consider 
only region 2 and are based on the average gain of 4.25 points when winning plus the fixed bonus of 25 US dollar 
cents. Actual earnings are computed pooling all treatments (Table 2). 
 
 
Treatments 
 
The experiment involved three treatments, which differed in the way subjects 
were allocated into activities: random assignment, qualified entry, and voluntary 
entry. Five subjects bid in low-stake auctions, five in the medium-stake auction, 
and five in the high-stake auction. The allocation of participants into activities 
remained fixed for a block of five periods. At the start of every block subjects 
observed the list of all individual U.S. dollar profits earned in the previous block 
sorted by activity and without identities.11 The rule to allocate subjects to activi- 
ties varied by treatment and was explained after the training phase. 
Under the Random Assignment treatment, subjects were reassigned to activi- 
ties through independent random draws at the start of every five-period block.12 
Under the Qualified Entry treatment, we assigned subjects to an activity ac- 
cording to a noisy measure of bidder ability based on past performance. All 
subjects in a session were ranked according to their accumulated point earnings 
at the start of every five-period block. This earnings ranking excluded the extra 
points assigned for merely participating in the common value auctions. The top 
five earners entered the high-stake auction, the bottom five earners entered the 
low-stake auction, and subjects ranked 6 to 10 were placed in the medium-stake 
auction. Any ties were broken randomly. The selection procedure was intended 
to place the more successful bidders (based on past performance) in the high 
 
bidder. Before each activity of the training phase, an experimenter read aloud the instructions while 
subjects followed along on their own copy. At the conclusion of these initial instructions subjects 
answered five computerized quiz questions to test their instruction comprehension for that activity, 
and were paid $1 for each correct answer. Besides providing incentives for subjects to consider the 
instructions carefully, this quiz also provided explanations for any wrong answers. 
11. In one of the 12 sessions, more than five bidders were bankrupt during six of the final 
periods. In that case, we reduced the market size of the medium-stake auction to four bidders, with 
the number of bidders always posted on subjects’ computer screens. 
12. In principle it was possible for a subject to be assigned to the same activity in all periods. In 
practice this never occurred, except for one subject who was bankrupt in all periods due to large 
losses during the training periods. This subject thus always bid in the low-stake auction. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Actual earnings 
Equilibrium earnings 
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value auction, similar to the good financial standing and successful bidding ex- 
perience included in the qualification procedure for auctions in the field dis- 
cussed in the section on selection in field auctions. Of course, the technical 
capability required for qualification is not a criterion relevant for a laboratory 
experiment. Past performance is partly due to luck, namely the randomness of 
the signals received. Past performance is also due in part to skill, such as the 
ability to avoid negative earnings and the winner’s curse. 
Under the Voluntary Entry treatment, subjects chose the activity for which 
they wanted to bid in for the upcoming five-period block. They stated their 
first, second and third choice, and the allocation algorithm provided subjects 
with the incentive to truthfully reveal their preferences over activities without 
interference from strategic considerations about over- or under-subscription   
of activities. The algorithm first placed five subjects into the high-stake auc- 
tion. Subjects obtained their first choice whenever possible. Since the capacity 
was five bidders in each auction activity, sometimes an activity was over-subscri- 
bed. In such cases the assignment to the high-demand activities was randomly 
determined among those who ranked that activity highest.  When an activity was 
under-subscribed, we next allocated those subjects who ranked that activity as 
second choice. Subjects who did not get their first choice were placed into their 
second choice whenever possible. If there were still slots available, we then 
considered also those who ranked it third choice. The algorithm then placed 
five subjects into the medium-stake auction following the same rules as above.13 
 
Details 
 
In all treatments, the number of bidders per high- and medium-stake auctions 
was held constant at n = 5 to preserve comparability of results.14 We provide 
full feedback each period about the activity outcome. In the low-stake activity, 
after every period a subject observed the realized company value for the buyer, 
their period earnings in points, and their cumulative balance in dollars. In the 
medium- and high-stake activities, each auction involved new random draws for 
the true item value ( x0 ) and for item private estimates (x). All bids were posted 
from highest to lowest along with the corresponding estimate values as well as 
all individual profits (or losses) (bidder identification numbers were suppressed) 
and the value of x0 . 
 
13. Before proceeding to assign subjects to the medium-stake auction, the algorithm removed 
their preferences for the high-stake auction from their rankings since this auction was already 
filled. Bidders were placed into a common value auction that they least preferred in only two times 
(out of 261 non-bankrupt activity rankings). If a subject who could not get their first choice specified 
a common value auction as their second choice, then they were assigned this second choice when 
space was available. If a subject who could not receive their first choice instead indicated that the 
low-stake auction was their second choice, then they were placed in the low-stake auction unless the 
common value auctions did not yet have five bidders each. 
14. For brief periods following bidder bankruptcies the bidder numbers fell below five. A 
subject is bankrupt if she had a negative US dollar cumulative balance. Because they are no longer 
liable for losses, bankrupt bidders may engage in irresponsibly high bidding. For this reason they 
were automatically assigned to the low-stake auction in all treatments. Cox, Dinkin and Swarthout 
[2001] find no evidence that limited liability increases the winner’s curse. Since in our experiment 
some markets occasionally had fewer than five bidders, the number of bidders in the subject’s market 
was always posted at the top of bidders’ computer screens. 
 
  
We recruited 180 subjects by email using ORSEE (Greiner [2015]), drawn 
from the diverse student population at Purdue University. Each treatment invol- 
ved 60 subjects divided into four sessions.  The experiment was programmed and 
conducted with the software z-Tree (Fischbacher [2007]). No eye contact was 
possible among subjects during the experiment due to visual dividers between 
computer stations. Average earnings were $20.08 per subject (standard devia- 
tion $7.20). Sessions lasted less than two hours, including instruction reading, 
quizzes, and a post-experiment questionnaire. 
 
 
RESULTS 
 
Here we report five main results. The focus is on the voluntary and qualified 
entry into auctions with different stakes, and the random assignment serves as 
a baseline that replicates the standard procedure in auction experiments. This 
section is articulated into subsections that focus on the main treatment effects 
(Results 1-3), the impact of self-selection (Result 4), and the types of individual 
bidders (Result 5). Before presenting the main results, it is useful to comment 
on the patterns of bidder turn-over across the auctions. If the group composi- 
tion is determined largely because of stable preferences for a specific auction, 
then there may be in little turn-over. A similar outcome may occur if the group 
composition depends on individual cumulative earnings, given that the high- 
stake auction generates higher potential profit. In the experiment, instead, the 
turn-over rates were generally high. In the Qualified Entry treatment only 20% 
of the bidders remained in the high-stake auction for the entire session, which is 
an average of one out of five bidders. This fraction was just 8% in the Volun- 
tary Entry and 0% in Random Allocation treatment. Bidder selection was more 
effective in keeping subjects out of the high-stake auction. About 53% never 
entered it in the Qualified Entry treatment, 32% in Voluntary Entry, and 15% in 
Random Allocation treatment. 
 
Main treatment effects 
 
Self-selecting into their preferred activity is generally credited for improving 
agents’ welfare. Our first result indicates, however, that assigning people to ac- 
tivities according to their revealed preferences made them worse off on average, 
despite preferences being elicited in an incentive-compatible way. 
 
Result 1: The pooled profits from all activities were lower when subjects could 
voluntarily choose where to bid than in the other treatments. 
Support: Table 2 reports the total profits earned by bidders. Subjects in the 
Voluntary Entry treatment on average earned over 20% lower profit compared to 
the other two treatments, and cross-sectional regressions shown in the appendix 
(with robust variance estimates clustering to account for intra-session correla- 
tion) indicate that these profits are significantly lower than the Qualified Entry 
treatment (p-value = 0.039) and marginally significantly lower than the Random 
Assignment control treatment (p-value = 0.075). 
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Table 2. Mean period earnings (US dollars) 
 
Treatment Low-stake 
auction 
Medium-stake 
auction 
High-stake 
auction 
Sum of 
earnings 
Random Assignment 0.148 0.033 0.055 + 0.236 
 (0.856) (0.998) (1.694)  
Qualified Entry 0.090 0.087 0.043 + 0.220 
 (0.818) (0.936) (1.482)  
Voluntary Entry 0.052 – 0.017 – 0.061 – 0.026 
 (0.844) (1.021) (1.796)  
Treatments Pooled 0.099 0.035 0.014 + 0.148 
 (0.840) (0.985) (1.657)  
Note: Standard deviations shown in parentheses. 
 
 
 
Many participants randomly assigned to a common value auction often 
placed bids with negative expected profits. The data are thus consistent with 
the literature documenting the winner’s curse (Kagel and Levin [2002]). Our 
novel finding is that the frequency of these winner’s curse bids increased in the 
Voluntary Entry treatment. 
 
Result 2: When bidders voluntarily enter into the common value auctions, they 
suffered from the winner’s curse more frequently than in the other treatments. 
Support: Table 3 and Figure 2 provide support for Result 2. Table 3 sum- 
marizes the profits and frequency of winner’s curse bids in the common value 
auctions for the three treatments (col. 1, 2 and 4, 5, respectively) based on the 
25 periods following the initial training periods. 
 
 
Table 3. Summary statistics for common value auction by treatment 
 
 
(1) 
Average 
profits (in 
(2) 
RNNE Bid 
average 
(3) 
Auctions won by 
bidder with x1n 
Percent of winner’s curse 
bids, b > E  x0 | X = x1n  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: b = bid, x0 = item value, x1n = highest private estimate, RNNE = Risk Neutral Nash Equilibrium. Only 
periods with five bidders, pooling medium-stake and high-stake auctions, and value draws in region 2 are in- 
cluded. (1) reports the average period profits of the winner in each treatment (including relevant participation 
points), with standard errors in parentheses; (2) displays the average profits that would be earned at the RNNE 
for the realized value and estimate draws, with standard errors in parentheses; (3) indicates the percentage of 
auctions in which the bidder with the highest estimate won the auction; (4) and (5) show the percentage of bids 
that are winner’s curse bids, which are defined as bids that exceed the item’s expected value conditional on 
being the highest estimate. 
 
 
tokens) profits (in 
tokens) 
(percent) (4) 
All bidders 
(5) 
High 
bidders 
Random – 1.64 4.91 57.8 35.8 66.5 
Assignment (0.51) (0.31)    
Qualified – 1.54 4.91 67.5 36.6 55.3 
Entry (0.47) (0.31)    
Voluntary – 2.61 5.27 61.9 48.8 75.6 
Entry (0.58) (0.36)    
 
  
Figure 2. Frequency of winner’s curse bids 
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The winner’s curse frequency in the Voluntary Entry treatment is nearly one- 
half of the bids, compared to about one-third of the bids in the other two treat- 
ments (Table 3). In order to compare the bidding performance of the auctions 
across treatments, we focus on the propensity to submit winner’s curse bids using 
standard panel data econometrics. In particular, we estimate Probit models to 
compare overbidding across treatments, using robust variance estimates that al- 
low for intra-subject and intra-session correlation. Treatment differences are as- 
sessed through dummy variables. These estimates are reported in the appendix, 
and they indicate that the winner’s curse frequency is marginally significantly 
higher in the Voluntary Entry treatment compared to the Random Assignment 
control treatment (p-value = 0.056) and compared to the Qualified Entry treat- 
ment (p-value = 0.081).15 
The above comparisons refer to all bidders, but of course the directly payoff- 
relevant bids in a given period are the highest, winning bids. Here we consider 
winning bidders who bid above the conditional expected value and therefore 
suffered from the winner’s curse (col. 5 of Table 3). Based on panel regression 
estimates shown in the appendix (with robust variance estimates for session 
clustering), we conclude that in the Qualified Entry treatment the 55 percent 
rate is significantly lower (p-value < 0.001) than the 76% rate in the Voluntary 
Entry treatment. 
With experience, subjects learn to avoid in part the winner’s curse but lear- 
ning appears retarded in the Voluntary Entry treatment.  Figure 2 shows that 
 
 
15. Small differences across treatments exist in the training periods, but these bids occur before 
any treatment manipulations are introduced. The same statistical tests applied to these training 
periods never reveal any significant differences across treatments. This indicates that the random 
assignment of subjects to treatments worked properly. 
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the frequency of winner’s curse bids starts at approximately one-half and then 
declines over time in all treatments. The decline starts earlier in the Qualified 
Entry and Random Assignment treatments, compared to the Voluntary Entry 
treatment where this frequency fluctuates upward in many early periods and 
remains near or above one-half of the bids until the final third of the session. 
We now turn to performance under Qualifying Entry. 
 
Result 3: In the Qualified Entry treatment, pooled profits were indistingui- 
shable from Random Assignment. Only with respect to severe overbidding, in 
the Qualified Entry treatment bidders were marginally better. 
Support: Tables 2, 3, and 4 provide support for Result 3. The difference in 
terms of pooled profits between the Qualified Entry and Random Assignment 
treatments was not significant (p-value = 0.367). In terms of overbidding fre- 
quency, the Qualified Entry treatment is marginally significantly lower than the 
67% rate in the Random Assignment treatment (p-value = 0.084, Table 3). In 
addition to profits and overbidding, another measure of performance is the rate 
of bankruptcies. By the end of the session, 5% of bidders go bankrupt in the 
Qualified Entry treatment, which was significantly lower than the 13% in the 
Random Assignment treatment (p-value = 0.005) and the 18% in the Voluntary 
Entry treatment (p-value = 0.003).16 
 
Table 4. Accumulated profits and bankruptcy rates 
 
Treatment Average cumulative profit in 
the final period 
Percent of subjects bankrupt in 
the final period 
Random Assignment $12.30 13.3 
 ($1.20) (8 of 60 subjects) 
Qualified Entry $12.25 5.0 
 ($1.05) (3 of 60 subjects) 
Voluntary Entry $9.70 18.3 
 ($1.15) (11 of 60 subjects) 
Note: Standard error of the mean shown in parentheses. Subjects began session with $10 endowment. 
 
 
 
SELF SELECTION: WHO CHOOSES 
TO ENTER THE HIGH-STAKE AUCTIONS? 
 
Recall that in the Voluntary Entry treatment, every five periods the non- 
bankrupt subjects ranked the three activities and entered into their most preferred 
activity whenever possible. When ranking activities, subjects’ decision screens 
displayed the historical profit performance of individual bidders (shown anony- 
mously) in each activity during the preceding block of periods. This information 
revealed that the high-stake auction exhibited the lowest average profit and the 
highest (variance) risk (Table 2), and therefore a subject who believes he would 
 
16. These statistics are based on cross-sectional Probit models shown in the appendix, which 
cluster robust variance estimates that account for intra-session correlation. 
 
  
achieve typical earnings should avoid it. Nevertheless, the high-stake auction 
was the first choice in 40% of bidders’ rankings, the medium-stake auction was 
first choice in 32%, and the low-stake auction was the first choice the remai- 
ning 27%. This suggests that subjects focused on factors other than the mean 
and variance returns of the alternative bidding activities when choosing which 
auction to enter. 
There exist several reasons to expect better performance of bidders in the Vo- 
luntary Entry compared to the Random Assignment treatment but also reasons 
to expect worse performance, depending on the type of bidders who voluntarily 
enter the auctions. For this exploratory study we offer for consideration the 
following six factors through which entry might affect the frequency of bankrup- 
tcies and winner’s curse bids. Factors 1, 2, and 3 point toward improved perfor- 
mance and factors 4, 5 and 6 point toward detrimental effects. 
First, confused subjects may avoid the high-stake common value  auc-  
tions. Those subjects who did not understand the rules of the common value 
auction and are forced to participate in the Random Assignment treatment may 
opt to stay out in the Voluntary Entry treatment. Second, subjects with no prior 
auction experience may stay out. In the field, bidders in highly complex auc- 
tions are generally professionals who specialize and self-select into that acti- 
vity. These factors are conjectures based on a notion of ambiguity aversion (e.g., 
Chen, Katuscák and Ozdenoren [2007]). 
Third, subjects who plan to place “passive” bids may enter in greater numbers 
in common value auctions. A bid is passive when the aim is not to be competi- 
tive and win but instead to obtain the $0.25 participation payment awarded each 
period to bidders in the common value auction markets. This factor is specific 
for our experimental design and biases the experiment toward finding a bet- 
ter performance under the Voluntary Entry treatment. The experiment was ca- 
librated to include this participation payment to maintain the attractiveness of the 
common value auctions in light of the large and systematic winner’s curse. With 
the current design, this provides the opportunity for a small but risk-free payment 
each period for a bidder willing to bid passively. Thus, the average earnings by 
other aggressive bidders may be irrelevant for a subject who is considering a 
passive bidding strategy. 
Fourth, subjects with greater tolerance for risk may enter in larger numbers 
into common value auctions and bid aggressively. This factor is also a conjec- 
ture as there is no theoretical result providing unambiguous impacts of risk at- 
titude on bidding in common value auctions, but in some circumstances more 
risk seeking agents place higher bids (Kagel and Richard [2001]). Fifth, subjects 
who prefer contests and competition the most may enter more frequently into 
common value auctions. This factor is based on behavioral results that show 
how subjects’ “joy of winning” is a component of the utility function in bidding 
activities (Cooper and Fang [2008]), even when it leads to negative earnings 
(Sheremeta [2010]). We posit that its influence is weakest in the low-stake auc- 
tion because it does not involve a direct competition with other bidders. Sixth, 
overconfidence may also play role (Camerer and Lovallo [1999]). It is not the 
presence of overconfidence per se that can damage the performance of self-se- 
lection into activities but its correlation with abilities. If the degree of over- 
confidence is negatively correlated with the ability to bid, self-selection into 
the activities can make session participants worse off than random assignment. 
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To provide some initial evidence regarding these factors in mind, we next 
explore systematically what characteristics influenced subjects’ decision on 
whether to enter the high-stake auction. 
 
Result 4: Subjects who seek to enter the high-stake auction are more frequently 
male, have no previous experience in field auctions, have high cumulative ear- 
nings, and have avoided losses more frequently in previous common value auc- 
tions. Subjects who display a greater tolerance for risk are less likely to enter. 
Support: Support for Result 4 comes from Table 5, which presents two Probit 
models of bidders’ choice to rank the high-stake auction as their top choice. Mo- 
del (1) includes as regressors the frequency of experienced losses and highest private 
estimates in earlier periods, and model (2) employs instead the subject’s accumulated 
earning balance up to the period of entry choice. Since these earnings are endoge- 
nous, we use an instrumental variable approach that employs the frequency of recei- 
ving the high estimate in previous common value auctions and the period number as 
instruments for this variable. The results are consistent across both specifications.17 
The increased entry likelihood for male subjects is consistent with research 
documenting men’s greater willingness to enter competitions (e.g., Croson and 
Gneezy [2009]). The estimates also show that factors 2, 4, and 5 discussed above 
are significant in influencing voluntary entry, although not always in the expected 
direction. Consider first the evidence on factors expected to improve the perfor- 
mance of the Voluntary Entry treatment (1, 2, and 3). Confusion does not appear 
to play a significant role. Table 5 includes variables to capture subject compre- 
hension and confidence, but none of these variables are significantly associated 
with high-stake auction entry.18 The high-stake auction does not attract bidders that 
have more auction experience in the field; in fact, it is more likely to attract naïve 
bidders (i.e., those who report no auction experience in the field), which may be 
an important reason for the high rates of the winner’s curse and bankruptcy in this 
Voluntary Entry treatment. Our initial conjecture goes in the opposite direction 
to the empirical evidence. A possible interpretation is that high risk aversion is 
associated to low cognitive ability (Dohmen et al. [2010]), which is relevant for 
bidding in a complex setting such as common value auctions. 
Passive bidders exist but are few in number. A risk-free bid for the current 
parameters is one that is 15 experimental points or more below a subject’s value 
estimate. Such bids are certain to lie at or below the true common value, but they 
won only 2 of the 300 high-stake auctions after the training periods. Such bids 
represent only 5.8% of all high-stake auction bids after training. This rate of risk- 
free bidding was much higher in the Voluntary Entry treatment (12.2%), however, 
compared to the Qualified Entry (1.8%) and Random Assignment (3.5%) treat- 
ments. This provides evidence that bidding in the common value auctions varied 
depending on how bidders selected into the alternative bidding activities. 
 
17. These models exclude some other factors that are never correlated with auction preference, 
such as self-reported grade point average, class standing, and major field of study. We also include a 
dummy for only the final block of periods, since all other period block dummy variables were never 
statistically significant. Estimates of similar models for preference of the medium-stake auction do 
not reveal any significant explanatory variables, so we do not report them here. 
18. To measure confidence, after reading the instructions for the allocation rules after the training 
periods were over, we asked subjects “How do you think you will rank in terms of earnings among all 
participants?” There were five possible options, ranging from being among the three highest earners to be 
among the lowest three earners out of group of fifteen. This “confidence” question was not incentivized. 
 
 
  
Table 5. Probit models of preference for high-stake auction 
(Voluntary Entry treatment only) 
 
Dependent variable 
1 = top preference for high-stake auction 
0 = otherwise 
Model (1) Model (2) 
Frequency of losses in previous common value auctions – 1.00** 
(0.311) 
 
Frequency received highest value estimate in previous common value 
auctions 
– 0.32 
(0.215) 
 
USD earnings balance at time of ranking (instrumental variable)  0.17* 
(0.074) 
High tolerance for risk (investing $4 or more out of $5 in risk task) – 0.90** 
(0.349) 
– 1.01** 
(0.329) 
Perfect score on instructions comprehension quiz – 0.17 
(0.320) 
– 0.22 
(0.324) 
Poor score on instructions comprehension quiz (below 80%) – 0.54 
(0.388) 
– 0.04 
(0.560) 
Confident to be high earner in session (top 40%) 0.38 0.67 
 (0.416) (0.534) 
Confident to be low earner in session (bottom 20%) 0.25 0.71 
 (0.592) (0.538) 
Male 0.63* 
(0.286) 
0.56* 
(0.278) 
No field auction experience reported (e.g., eBay) 0.70* 
(0.315) 
0.88** 
(0.304) 
Final block of periods 0.38* 0.06 
 (0.151) (0.226) 
Constant 0.32 – 2.30** 
 (0.437) (0.775) 
Observations 261 261 
Number of subjects included 57 57 
Pseudo R-squared 0.154  
Note: Standard errors robust to clustering on subjects are shown in parentheses. ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05 (two- 
tailed tests). 
 
 
Consider now the evidence on factors expected to make the performance of 
the Voluntary Entry treatment worse (factors 4, 5, and 6). Subjects who are most 
willing to take on risk according to our separate risk assessment task, investing 
at least $4 out of their $5 stake in an attractive but risky investment, are signifi- 
cantly less likely to want to enter the high-stake auction. This is opposite to what 
was conjectured, but is consistent with the substantially greater frequency of 
passive and risk-free bids submitted in the Voluntary Entry treatment mentioned 
above, indicating that these are submitted by the more risk averse bidders who 
entered this auction. These passive bidders were not the cursed winners who 
suffered losses and sometimes went bankrupt.19 The frequency of both winner’s 
 
19. We attempted to estimate similar models using only the subset of bidders who chose risk- 
free bids in a majority of the five periods in the block following their entry choice. Unfortunately, 
too few bidders satisfy this criterion for meaningful analysis. 
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cursed bids and risk-free bids is higher in the Voluntary Entry than in other 
treatments, which suggests that the high-stake auction attracts different types  
of bidders. Some cautious bidders enter but seek mostly to collect the high- 
stake auction participation payment rather than bid competitively, while some 
other aggressive bidders frequently suffer from the winner’s curse perhaps due 
to lower cognitive ability. On balance the latter group tends to dominate since 
aggregate profits are lower and bankruptcies are higher in this treatment. 
 
 
Types of individual bidders 
 
The overall treatment comparisons reported above obscure substantial varia- 
tion across individual subjects. Some subjects bid much higher than others and 
often go bankrupt, some overbid but do not always bid above the conditional ex- 
pected item value, others bid closer to Nash equilibrium levels and avoid losses 
(but rarely win auctions), and a few subjects are passive and bid low, effectively 
withdrawing from the auction. In order to classify subjects into different types, 
we employ their median bid factor, where the bid factor equals to the bid mi- 
nus the private estimate. This median is calculated considering all post-training 
common value auction bids submitted by each individual. 
 
Table 6. Classification of bidders into types 
 
Average of 
median bid 
factor for 
type 
Total in 
classification 
Classification 
Random 
Assignment 
by  
Qualified 
Entry 
Treatment 
Voluntary 
Entry 
(a) Conservative or withdraw 
(b) About Nash: median bid 
within 1 of Nash 
(c) Small overbid: median bid  
E  x0 | X = x1n  
(d) Winner’s curse: 
E  x0 | X = x1n  < median 
bid < own estimate X 
(e) Strong winner’s curse: 
median bid > own estimate X 
– 282.7 4 1 0 3 
– 14.8 22 8 7 7 
– 11.7 70 27 26 17 
– 6.0 62 19 17 26 
 
3.1 
 
9 
 
4 
 
1 
 
4 
(f) Percent of subjects classified in (d) and (e) (winner’s 39.0 35.3 52.6 
curse bidders) in post-training periods    
(g) Percent of bids submitted in post-training periods in 30.8 27.9 47.8 
common value auction by subjects in (d) and (e)    
Note: Classification based on median bid factors in post-training periods when pooling medium and high-stake auc- 
tion bids. Total number of classified subjects is 167, which submitted common value auction bids in the post-trai- 
ning periods. Of the 180 subjects who participated in the experiment, 13 always bid in the low-stake auction,  
often because they were already bankrupt during the training periods. Category b includes 21 subjects who fit the 
definition plus a 22nd subject who had a median bid factor of – 17.9. This individual could have also been included 
in the withdrawal group, and this reclassification would have no influence on the conclusions drawn here. 
 
 
Based on median bid factors, we classified 167 subjects into five categories, 
which are shown in Table 6. A small group of bidders had median bid factors 
 
  
of less than – 28 and thus effectively withdrew from bidding. The risk neutral 
Nash equilibrium bid factor was around – 15, except for the infrequent cases of 
item values near the boundary of the value domain (outside of “region 2”). Bid- 
ders in category b had median bid factors within one unit of this level. The vast 
majority of bidders overbid compared to this benchmark, and our classification 
procedure divides them into those with a bid factor that implies typical expected 
winner’s curse bids (bid factor > – 10; category d) and those who overbid by    
a smaller amount (bid factor  – 10; category c).20 A small number of subjects 
(category e) had positive median bid factors indicating bids that often exceeded 
their estimate. The lowest two classes d and e contain the subjects whose median 
overbid was large enough to exceed the conditional expected value, so they can 
be considered winner’s curse bidders. The next result indicates that Voluntary 
Entry leads to more winner’s curse bidders in the common value auction than 
does Qualified Entry. 
 
Result 5: Bidders prone to winner’s curse bids participate more frequently 
in common value auctions in the Voluntary Entry treatment than the Qualified 
Entry treatment. 
Support: In the Voluntary Entry treatment about 52.6% of subjects are win- 
ner’s curse bidders (row (f) in Table 6), which is not significantly different from 
the Random Assignment baseline (p-value = 0.285)21, and is on the threshold  
of marginal significance compared to the 35.3% in the Qualified Entry treat- 
ment (p-value = 0.106). In the Voluntary Entry treatment nearly one-half of  
the bids submitted in the common value auctions were placed by individuals 
who were classified as winner’s curse bidders (row (g) in Table 6); by contrast, 
only about 30% of the common value auction bids were submitted by such bid- 
ders in the other two treatments. The difference in these frequencies between 
Voluntary Entry and Random Assignment is not quite statistically significant 
(p-value = 0.158), but the difference between Voluntary Entry and Qualified 
Entry is significant (p-value = 0.034). 
 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
Bankruptcies and winner’s curse are widespread and robust phenomena in 
common value auction experiments. Implications of these results for the field can 
be questioned because in naturally-occurring settings firms and individuals vo- 
luntarily enter when deciding to bid in auctions, and in many cases the auctioneer 
screens potential bidders in order to have only qualified participants. Qualifying 
bidding is especially important in procurement auctions, such as in public works 
projects. We report the first laboratory experiment on common value auctions 
 
 
20. Individual median bid factors are highly correlated between the training periods and the post- 
training treatment periods (correlation coefficient = 0.85). Consequently, the bidder classification 
is similar in the training and the post-training periods. Individual subjects typically either remain  
in their same class or improve by one class, due to the general reduction in overbidding over time 
(illustrated in Figure 2). 
21. The statistical tests reported in this paragraph are all based on Probit models shown in the 
appendix that employ robust variance estimates that allow for intra-session correlation. 
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that incorporates simplified versions of these entry mechanisms and study their 
impact on bidding behavior, profits, the winner’s curse, and bankruptcies. 
To date, there is no shared theoretical explanation for the observed winner’s 
curse phenomenon, although it is likely linked to cognitive limitations in statis- 
tical reasoning (Kagel and Levin [2002]; Casari, Ham and Kagel [2007]). Here 
we study whether self-selection and individual learning are behavioral mecha- 
nisms that can lessen the winner’s curse and the bankruptcy rate. The design is 
motivated by the rules observed in the field, not by theory. 
We report two main findings. First, letting auction participants self-select 
into the activities without barriers to entry has null or negative consequences 
on performance. Voluntary entry actually increases the fraction of overbidders 
in common value auctions compared to the benchmark of random allocation of 
subjects to auctions and does not lower bankruptcy rates. This result is not due 
to more people entering into the auction, as we kept market size constant. Thus, 
voluntary entry does not improve auction performance over random allocation 
of bidders. 
Second, qualifying entry—using simplified criterion similar to those that res- 
trict participation in large field auctions—reduces winner’s curse bidding only 
marginally in comparison to random assignment of subjects to auctions. This 
small behavioral difference arises even though some of the past performance in 
winning and profits earned is due to luck (i.e., the particular signal draws) rather 
than just skill at avoiding overbidding and the winner’s curse. Qualification also 
reduces the frequency of bankruptcies, as expected, but without fully eliminating 
it. 
Some general considerations are in order. Previous experiments under ran- 
dom assignment report the importance of aggregate improvements in bidding 
over time. Such improvements may originate from a combination of indivi- 
dual learning and survival of the smartest through avoided bankruptcies. One 
main conclusion of this study is that individual learning does not substantially 
differ under three different entry rules. Allowing participants to learn the logic 
of common value auctions with low-stakes and then eventually opting for a 
high-stake task does not seem to reduce the winner’s curse. We also find that 
entry rules impact bankruptcy rates but not pooled profits.  While qualified entry 
almost mechanically reduces bankruptcies, the level of “ecological” rationality 
of the market does not improve once a degree of freedom is added in terms of 
voluntary entry. Ex-ante one could postulate some about arguments to expect 
an improvement and others to expect a deterioration of performance. This study 
provides empirical evidence showing a net detrimental effect of self-selection in 
common value auctions. A larger sample of participants might have identified 
more precisely the type of self-selection at work. These arguments and explana- 
tions, though, remain exploratory since the topic of entry rules has largely been 
neglected by the theoretical literature on auctions. 
In the field, qualifications for entry are both financial (as in the experiment) 
and technical. This study shows that purely financial criteria help in reducing 
bankruptcy rates but fail to select the most competent bidders. Whenever there 
is a common value component in auctions, regulations about technical and expe- 
riential requirements should also be a key element in restricting entry to bidders. 
Experiments can complement field data in the study of common value auctions 
because they overcome the unobservability of the individual private estimate 
 
  
and, to a lesser extent, the true value of the object for each bidder. Consider for 
instance that most field auctions are hybrid with both a private and a common 
value components. The ideal field dataset to study the questions in this paper 
would be a pure common value good that is auctioned through a mechanism that 
undergoes an exogenous and unanticipated change in entry rules, while bidders 
remain constant in numbers and the underlying process generating estimates is 
unaffected. Although difficult to find, such a setting would help strengthen the 
external validity of this study. 
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APPENDIX 
PAIRWISE TREATMENT COMPARISONS FOR RESULTS SUMMARIZED IN TEXT 
 
 
Treatment comparisons of per-bidder profits earned (Result 1) 
Dependent variable = subject earnings 
 
 Model (1) Model (2) 
Random Assignment treatment dummy 2.60+  
 (1.25)  
Qualified Entry treatment dummy  2.56* 
(1.01) 
Constant 9.70** 
(0.67) 
9.70** 
(0.67) 
Observations 120 120 
R-squared 0.021 0.023 
Note: Omitted treatment is the Voluntary Entry treatment. Standard errors robust to clustering on sessions are 
shown in parentheses. ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05, + p < 0.10. 
 
 
 
 
 
Probit models of winner’s curse bid frequency (Result 2) 
Models 1 and 2: Dependent variable = 1 iff submitted bid is a winner’s curse bid 
Models 3 and 4: Dependent variable = 1 iff winning bid is a winner’s curse bid 
 
 Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) 
Random Assignment 
treatment dummy 
– 0.33+ 
(0.17) 
 – 0.24 
(0.22) 
 
Qualified Entry treatment 
dummy 
 – 0.31+ 
(0.18) 
 – 0.55** 
(0.15) 
Constant – 0.03 
(0.12) 
– 0.03 
(0.12) 
0.68** 
(0.14) 
0.68** 
(0.14) 
Observations 1595 1670 319 334 
Pseudo R-squared 0.013 0.011 0.007 0.033 
Note: Omitted treatment is the Voluntary Entry treatment.  Standard errors robust to clustering on subjects are shown 
in parentheses. ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05, + p < 0.10. 
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Probit Models of Subject Bankruptcy (Result 3) 
Dependent variable = 1 iff subject ends session bankrupt 
 
 Model (1) Model (2) 
Random Assignment Treatment Dummy 0.53** 
(0.19) 
 
Voluntary Entry Treatment Dummy  0.74** 
(0.25) 
Constant – 1.64** 
(0.15) 
– 1.64** 
(0.15) 
Observations 120 120 
Pseudo R-squared 0.035 0.063 
Note: Omitted treatment is the Qualified Entry treatment. Standard errors robust to clustering on sessions are shown 
in parentheses. ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05. 
 
 
 
 
 
Probit Models of Bidder Type (Result 5) 
Models 1 and 2: Dependent variable = 1 iff subject is classified as a winner’s curse 
bidder (row f of Table 6) 
Models 3 and 4: Dependent variable = 1 iff the bid is submitted in common value auction 
by a subject classified as a winner’s curse bidder (row g of Table 6) 
 
 Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) 
Random Assignment 
treatment dummy 
– 0.35 
(0.32) 
 – 0.44 
(0.32) 
 
Qualified Entry treatment 
dummy 
 – 0.44 
(0.27) 
 – 0.53* 
(0.25) 
Constant 0.07 0.07 – 0.05 – 0.05 
 (0.26) (0.26) (0.23) (0.23) 
Observations 116 108 1944 1966 
Pseudo R-squared 0.014 0.022 0.022 0.032 
Note: Omitted treatment is the Voluntary Entry treatment. Standard errors robust to clustering on sessions are shown 
in parentheses. ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
